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I. Introduction and Summary of Conclusions
A.) Issues
This memorandum analyses whether the actus reus requirement for the crime of
Complicity in Genocide may be committed by omission and to what extent Article 6(3)
of the ICTR Statute applies to the crime of Complicity in Genocide.1 Article 6(3) reads:
“(3) The fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present
Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of
criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed
to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or punish the
perpetrators thereof.”2
Therefore, this memorandum tries to determine whether ones failure to act will impute
criminal liability to a superior officer for the crime of Complicity in Genocide. In
analyzing this question, there are key issues which must be addressed:
1) How is Genocide defined by the ICTR?
2) Is Complicity in Genocide a direct offense?
3) What actions, or inactions, will support one being accused of Complicity in
Genocide?
4) Under the doctrine of Command Responsibility, under what conditions are a
superior responsible for the actions of his or her subordinates?
5) Therefore, under the doctrine of Command Responsibility can a superior
officer be found criminally liable for the actions of his or her subordinates?
The issue can be thoroughly examined by analyzing each of the preceding questions. As
a starting point, however, it must be emphasized that the crime of genocide is a specific

1

Email from Andra Mobberley for the Office of the Prosecutor detailing research topics for War Crimes
Prosecutions Lab.
“Research and analyse the actus reus requirement for Complicity in Genocide. Consider whether
Complicity in Genocide can be committed by omission. Consider the extent to which Article 6(3)
of the ICTR Statute applies to the crime of Complicity in Genocide. Assess and evaluate current
ICTR and ICTY cases, holding, and dicta, addressing these issues.” [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab A1].

2

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, annexed to S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Score, 49th
Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. doc s/RES/955 (1994) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab A2].
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intent crime, meaning in order to be convicted for the crime a specific intent —or dolus
specialis --, must be demonstrated.3 It is this intent requirement that makes it more
difficult to obtain convictions for Genocide and also to prove that the acts related to the
crime of Genocide (i.e. incitement, Complicity) took place. Problems arise in the
prosecution of the crime of Genocide when it is demonstrated that not only did the
alleged perpetrator not have the requisite intent to commit the acts, but they did not—in
fact—commit any of the criminal offenses charged.4
Complicity in Genocide is a separate offense from Genocide, yet to be convicted
of the crime of Complicity in Genocide it has to be proven that an act of Genocide has
been committed. A way to understand the distinction between the two crimes is to see
Genocide as requiring the intent to commit the crime and Complicity in Genocide as
requiring the knowledge that an individual’s actions (or inactions) would facilitate the
activities of the principal perpetrators.5
Under the doctrine of command responsibility a superior can be held criminally
liable for the actions of his or her subordinates if they knew or reasonably should have
known the criminal activities were taking place and failed to take reasonable measures to
correct or to alleviate the activities. Therefore, this memo will examine whether a
superior’s failure to act provides the necessary actus reus for the crime of Complicity in
Genocide.

3

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab A5]
4

Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. ICTY IT-95-10, Judgement 14 December 1999. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab A6]
5

See generally Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998 [Reproduced
in accompanying notebook at tab A5]
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B.) Summary of Conclusions

The actus reus requirement for the crime of complicity in genocide may be
fulfilled by an individual’s omission to act.6 Complicity in genocide may be committed
in one of three ways: complicity by instigation, complicity by procurement, and
complicity by aiding and abetting.7 In each instance the basic principle is whether the
perpetrator knew that his/her complicitious behavior would in some way facilitate the
completion of the crime of Genocide.8
Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute imposes criminal liability on superior officers for
their failure to act when they knew or should have known about the behavior of their
subordinates and failed to take adequate remedial measures.9 An individual occupying a
superior position is thought to be in the best position to deter criminal activity of their
subordinate officers by exercising or emphasizing their authority. As such, superior
officers should not be excused from being held criminally accountable when their
omission to act and/or to intervene with the criminal activities of their subordinate
officers results in Genocidal murder. While the superior officers may not have been the
principle perpetrators of the crime of Genocide, they should be considered equally
responsible for their failure to act thereby allowing their subordinate officers to commit
genocide. Such behavior on the part of a superior officer should be considered
6

See Discussion infra at §IIIB

7

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab A5]
8

See Discussion Infra at §IIIB

9

See Discussion Infra at §IIIC
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complicitious in that they aided in the commission of Genocide by not properly
sanctioning subordinate officers for committing the crime. In this way, the superior
officer is shares in the guilt of their subordinates, and his or her omission to act should
fulfill the actus reus requirement for Complicity in Genocide. Furthermore, this behavior
should fall within the jurisdiction of Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute regarding Command
Responsibility and prosecution of these perpetrators should then be sought.

II. Factual Background
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was created by United Nations
Security Council Resolution 955 on November 8, 1994.10 The Tribunal was established
in an effort to contribute to the “process of national reconciliation and to the restoration
and maintenance of peace in Rwanda.”11 In April of 1994 President Nyaryamira of
Uganda and President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda were killed in a plane crash at
Kigali airport.12

The Presidents had been involved in communications to reach some

type of civil and peaceful resolution to the war like revolutions taking place within the
country. The Hutu subsequently placed blame for the crash on Tutsi political elitist. This
incited a blood ridden war led by a Hutu lead interim government against the Rwandan
Patriotic Front in which approximately 750,000 Tutsis were killed. The incessant
fighting which ensued following the April 1994 plane crash of Ugandan President
Cyprien Ntaryamira and Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana prompted the United
10

Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (1998)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab A15]
11

Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No.ICTR-96-13-T, Case No. ICTR 96-13-T, Judgement 27 January 2000.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab A7]

12

See generally Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA (1998). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab A15]
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Nations to create the ICTR13. In November of 1994 the U.N. Security Council passed
Resolution 955 which effectively created the ICTR.14

III.

Legal Discussion
In order to determine whether Complicity in Genocide can be committed by

commission there are key issues which must be addressed. First it must be determined
which types of activities fulfill the actus reus portion of the crime of complicity in
genocide. Next, a determination must be made as to whether or not complicity in
genocide is a direct offense. Recognizing that Article 2 says that complicity in genocide
is a chargeable offense, we must next determine what constitutes complicity in genocide.
After looking at the several components of complicity in genocide we must then turn our
discussion to Command Responsibility to determine the scope of the doctrine and its
ramifications on a superior being held liable for the actions of his or her subordinates.
Finally, we will look to whether a superior officer’s omission, or failure to act will fulfill
the actus reus requirement for complicity in genocide. After addressing these issues the
reader will understand why under the provisions of Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute a
superior officer may be held criminally liable for the actions of his or her subordinates if
they failed to take adequate measures to modify or alleviate the actions of their
subordinates.

A.)

13

Definition of Genocide

Id.

14

Statute for the International Tribunal for Rwanda, annexed to S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453 mtg., 8
Nov. 1994, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at A2]

5

The aftermath of World War II necessitated the need to introduce a system of
accountability for the atrocities which had taken place in Europe. Article 1 of the
Genocide Convention established genocide as a “discrete and justiciable crime” under
international law.15 Further, the legacy of Nuremberg characterized and cemented into a
general legal understanding that certais crimes—such as Genocide—were both
inexcusable and international.16 In fact, Robert H. Jackson is quoted as having said,
“The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so
malignant and so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored,
because it cannot survive their being repeated.”17
History shows us, however, that these atrocities have been repeated. It is the
repetition of these horrendous crimes that makes it all the more important that the crime
of Genocide and its related crimes are punished and their perpetrators are held
accountable for their actions.
In order to be convicted with the crime of Complicity in Genocide it has to be
proven that an individual was, in fact, an accomplice to the crime of Genocide. Article 2
of the ICTR Statute defines Genocide “any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, such as:
(a) Killing members of the group
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
15

See generally William Schabas, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES (2000).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at A17]
16

Id.

17

See Michael P. Scharf BALKAN JUSTICE THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES
TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG (Carolina Academic Press, 1997). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
tab A16]
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(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”18
This definition of Genocide is the same definition adopted in the Genocide Convention,
and it has been retained by many other international criminal tribunals such as the ICTY
and the ICC.”19
Some view Genocide as the most horrific of all crimes.20 The ICTR has used this
expression in sentencing decisions.21 Genocide is a special crime in that it requires a
special intent or dolus specialis.22 Therefore, in order to prove that the crime of Genocide
has occurred it has to be proven both that one of the enumerated acts under Article 2(2)
of the ICTR have been committed against one of the listed groups and the presence of the
special intent element.23 The crime of Genocide may be understood as being comprised
of three prim ary elements: “1)the commission of at least one of the acts enumerated in
Article 2; 2)the direction of that act at one of the enumerated types of groups; and 3) the

18

See Article 2 of the ICTR Statute [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab A2]

19

The definition of “Genocide” the Genocide Convention maintains was subsequently adopted not only by
the ICTR, but also by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the ICC Statute.
See also the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
A4]

20

See generally William Schabas GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES (Cambridge
University Press 2000). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab A17]
21

See Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, 16; The ICTR notes
“The Chamber is of the opinion that genocide constitutes the crime of crimes.” See also Prosecutor v.
Akeyesu, Sentence, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T; See also Kayishema & Ruzindana Sentence, Case No. ICTR95-1-T, .[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab A8]

22

See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998 ¶558; the ICTR held
that “Special intent of a crime is the specific intention, required as the constitutive element of the crime,
which demands that the perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act charged.” [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab A5]

23

See ICTR Statute, Report on the ICTR and National Trials, July 1997. Available at:
http:/www.un.org/ictr. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab A2]
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intent to destroy the group in whole or in part.”24 To be successful in convicting a
defendant of Genocide, the preceding elements must be proven.

1.

Actus Reus Must be Inhumane in Nature and character, causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health
The actus reus requirement regarding the crime of Genocide can be understood as

containing four essential elements.25 They are:
“(a.)

the actus reus must be inhumane in nature and character, causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
(b) the actus reus must be committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack.
(c) the actus reus must be committed against members of the civilian population
(d) the actus reus must be committed on one or more discriminatory grounds,
namely national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds.”

The first requirement is that the actus reus be inhumane in nature andcharacter, causing
great suffering, or serious injury to body or mental or physical health. In its most basic
sense, mass killings are inhumane in nature. Genocide not only affects its victims, but it
also has a detrimental effect on society as a whole. For the crime of genocide to have
occurred, the acts must have been of such a serious nature as to shock the conscious and
be adverse to the acceptable standard of society.

2.

Actus reus Must be Committed as Part of a Systematic or Widespread
Attack

In order for Genocide to have been committed, the actus reus has to have been done as
part of a systematic or widespread attack; a “random inhumane act” is insufficient to
24

See generally Steven R. Ratner & Jason S. Abrams ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY (Clarendon Press 1997). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at A23]
25

See Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No ICTR-96-3, Judgement , 6 December 1996 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab A9]
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obtain a conviction for Genocide.26 Customary international law requires that the act be
either a widespread attack or a systematic attack, but it is not required that the attack be
both widespread and systematic.27 In the Akeyesu judgment “widespread” was defined as
“massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively with considerable
seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims.28 Systematic was defined as
“thoroughly organized action, following a regular pattern on the basis of a common
policy and involving substantial public or private resources.”29 After proving that
genocidal acts were done in either a systematic or widespread manner, one may be faced
with criminal charges for the crime of genocide.
3.

Actus Reus has to be Directed against the Civilian Population
The actus reus for any of the enumerated acts in Article 3 of the ICTR Statute

must be directed against the civilian population.30 The Akayesu and Rutaganda
Judgments define civilian population as “people who were not taking any active part in
the hostilities.”31 It may be argued that there is little difference between the mass killings
described as “Genocide” and the numerous amount of murders which are committed
during armed warfare. This argument lacks muster, because it is generally understood

26

See Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No.ICTR-96-3, Judgement, 6 December 1999. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab A9]

27

Id. at ¶68

28

See Prosecutor v. Akeyesu Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab A5]

29

Id.

30

Id. at ¶207.

31

See Prosecutor v. Akeyesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab A5]
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that war is different, and as such a different set of rules apply. Civilians are (at least
theoretically) less likely to take up arms against other military officials, and all attacks on
civilians are unwarranted, and it is such attacks are generally unacceptable in the
international criminal law sphere.
4.

Actus Reus Must be Based on Discriminatory Grounds
The actus reus must be directed at a “national, political, ethnic, racial, or

religious” group.32 Inhuman acts which are committed against people who do not fall
within any of these categories may be considered a crime against humanity if “the
perpetrator’s intention in committing these acts is to further his attack on the group
discriminated against.”33
B.

Definition of Complicity in Genocide
Complicity in genocide requires that a perpetrator acted as an accomplice by

participating in or contributing to the commission of genocide.34 Complicity as a form of
criminal participation in nearly every criminal justice system in the world.35
“Participation by Complicity in the most serious violations of international humanitarian

32

See Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T Judgment at ¶208. [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab A7]

33

Id.

34

See Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, 233,
n 889 (1998). The authors note, “The possible range of personas who may be held guilty of war crimes or
crimes against humanity is not limited to those who physically performed the illegal deed. Many others
have been held to be sufficiently connected with an offense to be held criminally liable.…” [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab A15]
35

See generally Prosecutor v. Akeyesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab A5]
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law was considered a crime as early as Nuremberg,” thus the Nuremberg Tribunal took
the initiative to identify acts which constitute Complicity.36
The ICTR defines Complicity in Genocide in terms of accomplice liability37. The
ICTR defines an accomplice as:
1)

A person or persons who by means of gifts, promises, threats, abuse of
authority of power, culpable machinations, or artifice, directly incites(s) to
commit such action or order(s) that such action be committed.

2)

A person or persons who procure(s) weapons, instruments, or any other
means which are used in committing such action with the knowledge that
they would be so used.

3)

A person or persons who knowingly aid(s) or abet(s) the perpetrator or
perpetrators of such action in the acts carried out in preparing or planning
such action or in effectively committing it.38

The Rwandan Penal Code sets forth three forms of criminal participation which
help to define the elements of Complicity in Genocide which nearly mirror the ICTR’s
definition of Complicity and which provide:
(a)Complicity by procuring means, such as weapons, instruments or any other
means, used to commit genocide, with the accomplice knowing that such
means would be used for such a purpose;
(b) Complicity by knowingly aiding or abetting a perpetrator of a genocide in the
planning acts thereof
(c) Complicity by instigation, for which a person is liable who, though not
directly participating in the crime of genocide, gave instructions to commit
genocide, through gifts, promises, threats, abuse of authority or power,
36

See Id. at ¶ 88 [Reproduced in tab A5]. The Nuremberg Tribunal explained Complicity as having
knowledge or awareness while participating in the following acts: planning, instigating, ordering,
committing or otherwise aiding and abetting in the commission of a crime. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case
No. IT-95-1-A, Judgment, 15 July 1999 at ¶ 141. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab A10 ]
37

See ICTR Statute, art. 91, Report on the ICTR and National Trials, July 1997. available at:
http://www.un.org.ictr. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at]
38

Id.
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machinations or culpable artifice, or who directly incited the commission of
genocide.39
Complicity is generally regarded as being a separate form of criminal activity, and
in fact several national and international criminal justice systems view Complicity as a
separate crime.40 For example, in the United States Complicity is described along the
lines of accomplice liability.41 Australia uses a ‘presence’ standard in determining
whether an individual may be held criminally liable for Complicity.42 Finally, under
French law an individual may be held liable if he knowingly instigated a crime, supplied
ammunition for the crime, gave orders for the crime to be committed, or aided in the
commission of the crime.43 The ICTR’s interpretation of accomplice liability is the
prevalent view in both customary international law and criminal and civil law systems.44
Thus, if it can be proven that an individual acted to facilitate the crime of genocide,
whether by instigation, procurement, or incitement, the individual may be charged as an
accomplice and therefore held criminally liable for the crime of complicity in genocide.
1.

The Actus Reus Requirement for Complicity in Genocide

39

Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment at ¶179 [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab A7]

40

William A. Schabas, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIMES OF CRIMES 285 (Cambridge
University Press 2000). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at A17]
41

Joshua Dressler, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed.) 111 (West 1999). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab A18]
42

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-95-1-A, Judgment, 15 July 1999 at ¶135; (citing the Australian
Common Law the Chamber states, “the most marginal act of assistance or encouragement can amount to an
act of Complicity…[which includes] presence.”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 10]

43

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-95-1-A, Judgment, 15 July 1999 at ¶ 135. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab A10]

44

Prosecutror v. Akeyesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab A5]
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It is well established that in the criminal context two elements are necessary to
prove a crime has occurred: the mens rea and the actus reus. The mens rea can be
understood as the mindset an individual has at the time a crime is committed—the intent
element or guilty mind. The actus reus is the act itself—the observable portion of a
crime.45 Additionally, the actus reus is the observable voluntary act or omission which
establishes criminal liability.46
Under article 2(3) of the Statute for the Tribunal makes the following acts
punishable: Genocide, Conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to
commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide.
Each of the aforementioned crimes involves a certain degree of both fault and
knowledge which should “bring the proscription of genocide to bear on a great variety of
specific conduct that would almost inevitably come within the reach of the broad
confines of the actus reus.”47 In this manner, criminal liability can more easily be
demonstrated and the perpetrators of genocidal acts could be convicted for their crimes.
For the crime of Complicity, the actus reus requirement is fulfilled in terms of the
individual acting as an accomplice to the crime of Genocide.48 The Trial Chamber of the
ICTY has held that acts of encouragement such as incitement may reach the necessary

45
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level of accomplice liability in order to establish the actus reus requirement for
Complicity.49 Viewing Complicity in terms of accomplice liability allows criminal
justice systems to hold individuals accountable for offenses which are not directly
committed by an individual. It is important to view Complicity as a separate crime in
order to provide society with some sense of retribution for criminal acts.50 In this way,
an individual who claims to have not committed the criminal act itself cannot be relieved
of criminal responsibility for his complicitous behavior. 51 In Prosecutor v. Akeyesu, the
ICTR held that Genocide and Complicity in Genocide were not mutually exclusive
crimes, and an individual could be charged with one crime without being convicted of the
other.52 The ICTR distinguished between an accessory or accomplice and a concurrent
wrongdoer.53 In making this distinction, the ICTR found that while an accomplice did

49

See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1 at ¶ [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab A10]
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need to have knowledge of the intent of the principal actor, they did not have to share the
“desire to destroy.”54 An aider and abettor, on the other hand, needs to act with the
“specific genocidal intent,” and according to the Tribunal the actus reus (“planning,
preparing, or execution of the crime of genocide”) could be an omission.55 Thus the
emphasis in this situation is placed on the knowledge of the action rather than the intent
to commit the action or on the action itself.
In the same manner, the ICTY held in Prosecutor v. Tadic that:
[A]ssisting and abetting includes all acts of assistance by words or acts that lends
encouragement or support, as long as the requisite intent is present. Under this
theory, presence alone is not sufficient if it is an ignorant or unwilling presence.
However, if the presence can be shown or inferred, by circumstantial or other
evidence, to be knowing and to have a direct and substantial effect on the
commission of the illegal act, then it is sufficient on which to base a finding of
participation and assign the criminal culpability that accompanies it.56

The crime of Genocide is so serious that its related crimes should also be punished.
Complicity in Genocide can be committed in one of three ways. These include
complicity through instigation, complicity by procuring means, and complicity by aiding
and abetting.
a.

54

Id..
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Id.

Complicity by Instigation
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To instigate is to “goad or incite someone to take some action or course.”57 Such
action was demonstrated by Jean-Paul Akayesu when he ordered the killing of thousands
of Tutsis in April of 1994.58 The Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Akayesu found that an
individual may be held liable for Complicity by Instigation if they give instructions to
commit Genocide or by inciting the commission of Genocide.59 Therefore, Akayesu’s
behavior conformed to that described in Section 1 of Article 91 of the Rwandan Penal
Code. Akayesu, further, used his position of authority to encourage the commission of
Genocide upon the Tutsis.60 This behavior substantially conforms to the reprehensible
behavior the ICTR seeks to prosecute in its mission to restore peaceful relations within
the nation. The Chamber reemphasized and followed the rule of law proscribed in
Article 91 in Prosecutor v. Ruggio and affirmed that “direct and public incitement [to
commit genocide] is a form of complicity.61
The ICTY has also held that acts of incitement and encouragement are sufficient
to fulfill the requirements for and thus serve as the actus reus for complicity in
Genocide.62 Thus, both the ICTY and he ICTR have held individuals criminally
responsible for Complicity in Genocide for their acts of instigation, encouragement, and
incitement. Thus, individuals who are involved in the instigation, encouragement, and
57
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incitement of Genocide should be criminally liable for such acts under the legal premise
Complicity in Genocide.
b.

Complicity by Procuring Means
Procurement is the act of getting or obtaining something.63 In terms of

procurement, criminal liability is imputed when an individual obtains weapons,
instruments, or any other means and these instruments and/or means are used in the
commission of the crime of Genocide.64

Additionally, the individual has to have

obtained the weapon with the knowledge that they would be used in the commission of
the acts of Genocide.65 It does not matter that the individual who procures the weapons is
not the individual who actually commits the crime; rather it is the underlying principle
that contributing weapons enables the Genocidal acts to take place. For these activities,
an individual may be held criminally liable for Complicity through Procurement.
c.

Complicity by Aiding and Abetting
To aid and abet means to “facilitate the commission of a crime, or to promote its

accomplishment.”66 In order to aid in a crime, it is not necessary that an individual is
present at the scene of the crime; it is enough that the individual “knowingly aid[ed] or
abet[ed] a perpetrator of [G]enocide in the planning or enabling acts thereof.”67 An
individual may be held responsible for the killing of another by 1)Soliciting or aiding
another in killing, 2)by agreeing with another party that a third party should be killed who
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is subsequently killed by the other party, 3)by causing an innocent person to kill, and 4)
by causing the death of another individual.68 Aiding and abetting can be found when an
accomplice is ready to come to the aid of a perpetrator regardless of whether the
accomplice does so or not.69 Additionally, criminal liability can be imputed to an
individual who prevents innocent individuals from attempting to intervene in the
commission of a crime.70
The standard utilized by the ICTY is one of “substantial assistance.”71 A person
may be found criminally liable if his conduct either directly or substantially assisted in
the commission of a crime.72 Model Penal Code §2.06(3) posits that an individual
demonstrating the conduct to establish criminal complicity is both “one who solicits or
aids [and] also one who agrees to aid or attempts to aid in the planning or commission” of
an offense.73 Complicity in Genocide by aiding and abetting means an individual has
made themselves available for the commission of the crime by helping to plan and/or
further the commission of the crime. If an individual —through acts or omissions —
substantially assists in the furtherance of the crime of genocide, the individual is
criminally liable for Complicity in Genocide.
C.

Command Responsibility and its implications for criminal liability
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Forcing individuals to be criminally accountable for the horrific tragedies
experienced by the Jewish population during the reign of the Third Reich, the Nuremberg
Tribunal expressed that “[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not by
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the
provisions of international law be enforced.”74
The modern doctrine of command responsibility stems from the laws of war
resulting from the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials at the close of World War II.75 During
this period cases emerged in which there was no evidence that a superior officer had
either ordered the subordinate’s actions or had the same intent to commit the actions of
the subordinate, however the superior officer did have the authority to take steps to
ensure that the criminal activity was not completed.76 The doctrine of command
responsibility ensured that a superior officer could be held liable for the same
“substantive crimes as their subordinates.”77
Under the doctrine of command responsibility, a superior office may be held
criminally responsible for the actions of his or her subordinates if the superior knew or
should have known that crimes were being committed, and the superior officer failed to
take reasonable remedial actions to prevent the occurrence of the crimes or to punish the
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The Trial of Major War Criminals: Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at
Nuremberg Germany, Part 22, at 445, 447 (1950). [Reproduced in accompanying notebo9ok at tab]
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76

Id

.
77

Id.

19

subordinate officer for committing the crimes.78

Article 6(3) of the Statute for the ICTR

provides:
“The fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 of the present Statute was
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal
responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was
about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the
perpetrators thereof.”79
Assigning individual responsibility to individuals who occupy positions of
authority helps to ensure that individuals do not use and/or abuse their official positions
to avoid criminal prosecution for war crimes or crimes against humanity.
1.

Imputed by Officer’s Omission to Act
The doctrine of command responsibility seems to rest on two agreed upon

principles: “first, a superior can be liable for an omission—that is, for failing to act when
it is his duty to control a subordinate….Second, a superior is only liable if he knew or
should have known that the subordinate committed or was about to commit a violation of
humanitarian law.”80 Liability under the doctrine of command responsibility is imputed
through an affirmative duty on behalf of a superior officer, therefore an omission may
constitute the actus reus portion of the crime.81 Since under this doctrine the liability of
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the superior comes from the subordinate’s illegall act, “a duty must exist if there is to be a
legally relevant connection between the subordinate’s act, the superior’s omission, and
the eventual imposition of liability…[t]he superior thus defines the contours of the
command responsibility doctrine—to whom and in what situations command
responsibility should apply.”82
Prosecutor v. Karadzic is a principal case in which responsibility for criminal
activity was imputed under the doctrine of command responsibility.83 Each count in the
indictment included charges of command responsibility, and the charge of genocide
depended on Karadzic’s failure to take adequate measures to prevent the actions of his
subordinate officers.84
2.

Imputing Responsibility to Civilians
The Nuremberg Tribunal applied the doctrine of command responsibility to both

military officials and civilians alike.85 In doing so, individuals who would have
otherwise been excused from being held accountable were made to answer for such
atrocities as failing to either oppose or even prevent to some degree the atrocities against
the Jewish population.86 It is thought that individuals who are in higher ranking
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positions—either civilian or military—are more often times in a much better position to
exert some type of authority and therefore to prevent atrocities.87 In terms of civilian
leaders, some urge that “there does not seem to be any compelling reason why promoting
responsible behavior by civilian leaders is a less important concern than with respect to
military leaders.”88 Rupa Bhattacharyya commented:
“If compliance can be imposed under international law on individuals who are
acting in an official capacity, then there is no legitimate reason why individuals
acting in private capacities are no subject to international laws. If, after all, the
international legal order is to be constituted as a rule-of-law system, it is
necessary that respect for that law be fostered through its equal application to all
members of international society.”89
Hence, this thought offers an explanation for holding both military and civilian
individuals responsible for the actions of those in subordinate positions. It is the “public
trust relationship” between military and civilian leaders which makes it reasonable and
necessary to “impose some kind of legal duty on those who are in…[positions] to prevent
atrocities.”90
In reference to criminal liability for acts that violate human dignity, “the
Nuremberg and other prosecutions of Axis defendants clearly established individual
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criminal responsibility for crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes”; however there are still several instances where individual liability should be
imputed along with imputing the superior for an individual’s behavior.91
History demonstrates atrocities on the international front having to some degree
of reoccurrence; however international criminal law should continue to force perpetrators
of criminal activity to be held accountable for their actions. The focus should remain on
individuals who perpetrate the crimes and those who facilitate the crimes, because as a
general notion “personal accountability and punishment will serve as the best deterrent”
to repeated commission of particular offenses.92
Case law demonstrates both the U.S.’s domestic policy and the international law’s
practice of holding superior officers criminally liable fore the behavior of their
subordinates. In the Yamashita case, General Tomoyuki Yamashita was found criminally
liable for the action of his subordinate officers during World War II.93 Yamashita’s
troops had committed various crimes against both the native Filipino population and on
American prisoners of war. The commission held that the crimes committed by
Yamashita’s troops were “so extensive and widespread, both as to time and area, that
they must either have been willfully permitted by the accused, or secretly ordered by the
accused…[where] there is no effective attempt by a commander to discover and control
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the criminal acts, such a commander may be held responsible, even criminally liable, for
the lawless acts of his troops.”94
Similar to the Yamashita case, Jean Kambanda was held criminally liable for the
actions of his subordinates in Prosecutor v. Kambanda.95 As Prime Minister of the
Interim Government of Rwanda Kambanda was the head of the 20 member Council of
Ministers and had de jure authority over the members of his government.96 Kambanda
admitted to having attended meetings in which “the course of massacres were actively
followed, but no action was taken to stop them.”97 Kambanda’s acts and omissions to act
allowed the Chamber to hold him criminally responsible for and guilty of the crime of
Genocide, Conspiracy to Commit Genocide, Direct and Public Incitement to Commit
Genocide, Complicity in Genocide, and Crimes against Humanity.98 Thus, the court held
that Kambanda’s omissions were sufficient to fulfill the actus reus, and ultimately to
convict him of Complicity in Genocide.

3.
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In order to impute the actions of a subordinate to a superior officer, the officer has
to have had some type of control over the actions of the subordinate officer. Actual or
formal power of control over one’s subordinates is a determining factor in charging
civilians with superior responsibility.99 An individual’s belonging to a chain of command
does not automatically impute a duty to “prevent or repress violations by a
subordinate.”100 More specifically, an individual must exhibit a certain level of formal
authority over his or her subordinate bases on the command hierarchy in order to be held
responsible for the subordinate’s actions.101 Therefore, if an individual lacks any position
of authority or the ability to influence subordinate thought, it becomes more difficult to
impute responsibility for the criminal activity of those thought to be the individual’s
“subordinates” to the individual.102
IV.

Conclusion
Individuals who commit criminal acts must be made to account for their activities and

prosecuted for such actions. This memorandum provides substantial evidence in favor of
holding a superior officer criminally liable for Complicity in Genocide when the superior
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officer knew or should have known about the behavior of his/her subordinate officers and
were remiss in acting to punish or altogether alleviate this behavior. By omitting to act to
take remedial measures against these subordinate officers, superior officers are sending
the signal that the behavior of the lower ranking officers is okay; additionally, by
omitting to act to take remedial measures the superior officer is assisting in the
furtherance of the criminal activity—in the present case of Genocide—and should be
forced to account for his actions and the actions of the subordinate officer.
An individual charged with Complicity in Genocide has not necessarily
committed the crime of Genocide. The two crimes are distinguishable, and a person can
be charged with one without being charged with the other. For an individual to be
convicted of Complicity in Genocide, however, it must be proven that the crime of
Genocide has, in fact, occurred. If a superior officer is knowledgeable as to the
Genocidal behavior of his or her subordinate officers and fails to take remedial measures
against the officers, Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute allows the criminality of the lower
ranking officers to be imputed to the superior officer. The failure to act, therefore, should
be sufficient to fulfill the actus reus requirement for the crime of Complicity in
Genocide. An omission of this nature on the part of the superior officer should, therefore,
make the officer criminally liable for the crime of Complicity in Genocide under Article
6(3) of the ICTR Statute. It is crucial that individuals be forced to account for their
behavior, and as an extension of that when a superior officer is in a position to deter
criminal activity it is crucial that they are made to account for the behavior of their
subordinate officers.
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